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Abstract 
Air-to-air combat between two aggressive 
aircraft , both equipped with medium-range 
guided missiles, is .a key element of 
future air warfare. This dynamic coni lict 
can be viewed as an interaction of a two- 
target diiferential game (between the air-- 
craft) and two independent missile- 
aircraft pursuit-evasion games. The infor- 
mation structure is, however, rather 
intricate: though perfect information can 
be assumed between the two aircraft, the 
missiles have a limited detection range, 
beyond which information has to be 
forwarded by the launching aircraft. More- 
over, missile firing cannot be assumed 
detectable. Problems of such complexity 
haven't been treated yet in the frame of 
classical differential game theory. In 
this paper a prototype Pilot Advisory 
System (PADS), designed to solve the 
problems facing the pilot in such an 
engagement, is described. PADS proposed to 
be an expert System, which operates in 
real--time and has a "knowledge base" 
incorporating differential game concepts 
and solution elements. PADS simultaneously 
evalua.tes potential success with the 
respective risks and advises the pilot 
when to fire his missile and when to start 
an evasive maneuver. This advisory system 
can guarantee survival when so desired by 
the pilot. but in most situations it maxi- 
mizes the probability of victory with an 
accepted level of' risk. 
1. Introduction 
A future air-to-air combat scenario can be 
characterized as a dynamic conflict 
between two adversary groups of high 
performance supersonic aircraft (such as 
ATF, EFA, Raffale, etc end 'Red' 
equivalents), both equipped with advanced 
medium-range guided missiles. The signifi- 
cant events in such a multiple aircraft 
scenario (i.e., eventual aircraft des- 
truction) are in most cases direct conse- 
quences of relatively brief duels between 
two opponents. This observation suggests 
that one can consider the 1x1 air-to-air 
engagement not only as the simplest 
example, but also as a building block of 
more complex scenarios. Successful 
analysis of such an air combat duel is un- 
doubtedly a prerequisite for further 
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investigation. For these reasons the pre - 
sent paper concentrates on the analysis of 
air - to-air combat between two aggressively 
operating aircraft, both equipped wit11 
similclr guided missiles. The objective of 
each pilot in such a duel is to shoot down 
the opponent aircraft without being hit. 
The conflicting nature of the scenario 
calls for a non-cooperative differentj-a1 
game formulation [ 13 . This dynamic 
conflict can be viewed as an inturacLion 
of a "two--target differential game" 
(between the aircraft) and two independent 
missile-aircraft "pursuit-evasion games"'. 
The target sets in the two-target game are 
the respective missile firing zones, each 
being the "capture zone" of a missile- 
aircraft pursuit-evasion game of kind [21. 
The encounter between the two aircraft 
(Blue and Red) exhibits a "threat 
reciprocity" [31 and must terminate with 
one of the following outcomes: 
a. Red alone is shot down = Blue wins. 
b. Blue alone is shot down = Red wins. 
c. Both are shot down = Mutual kill. 
d. Both s u r v i v e  = Draw. 
The solution of the relevant two-target 
differential game with the given target 
sets is the decomposition of the set of 
admissible initial conditions into the 
respective zones of fixed outcome. 
Inside the Blue and Red winning zones many 
zero-sum games of degree can be played. 
According to the concept of "combat games" 
C41 the winning player is minimizing and 
its opponent i s  maximizing the same cost 
function. Different cost functions may 
yield different optimal strategies, but 
all games have the same guaranteed 
outcome, namely the termination of the 
game (in some finite time) on the target 
set of the winning player. 
If the engagement starts in the "mutual 
kill" zone both players have to play 
aggressively otherwise the state of the 
game may slip to the opponent's winning 
zone. However, cooperative strategies can 
drive the state of the game to the "draw" 
zone. 
In the "draw" zone each player can 
guarantee his own survival against any 
action of the opponent, but cooperative 
aggressive strategies may lead to "mutual 
kill" - 
In future air combat most engagements will 
start beyond visual ranges (BVR), thus the 
initial conditions of the above described 
two-target game are generally in the 
"draw" zone - The only guaranteed outcome 
of such non-cooperative game is a "draw" ~ 
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This result, which is in contrast to the 
very essence of an air-to-air combat and 
denies the justification of the high cost 
of advanced aircraft and missile develop- 
ment, is clearly unacceptable fro 
operational point of view. At the 
nd, cooperative strategies are also inad- 
issible in a hostile environment. 
The inherent non-cooperative nature of the 
scenario requires each player to determine 
his "preference ordering" [SI between 
"mutual kill" and "draw" and to act 
accordingly. Such "preference ordering" is 
one of the elements of the players' 
strategy. and therefore one cannot assu 
that it is known by the opponent. This un- 
plies, as pointed out recently 
r difficulty in the proper 
mathematical for ulation and consequently 
in a meaningful analysis of future air 
ess, the challenging problem of 
bat analysis has attracted 
a1 research interest (C7-101 just 
to mention a few), without yielding yet 
any satisfying solution. 
In [71 a zero-sum formulation is used with 
a cost function which is the difference 
between the respective missile-aircraft 
miss distances. The authors of C81 propose 
a non zero-sum formulation with the same 
cost function taking into account the 
lethal range of the missiles. Both papers 
erically solved exa 
prescribed timing for missile launch. 
Unfortunately, such an assu 
the most important control element of the 
ely the optimal selection of 
issile firing ti e. An interesting new 
approach is presented i C Q l  by using a 
zero-sum bicriterion ga e formulation and 
proposing pareto-optimal security and res- 
ponse strategies. However. 
given in the paper did not d 
dvantage of th 
extending the 
C2l for vehicles 
both works the 
represent the "no-escape" firing envelopes 
(the "capture" zones) of advanced all- 
aspect, fire and forget air-to-air 
issiles - This 
plies that ga ination on one of 
the target sets is 
firing which guaran s the destruction of 
Curiously, the interpr 
apparently satisfactory 
as an 
evader. Though he cannot force the game 
to his own target set (the no-escape 
envelope ~f his missile), he can still 
fire a missile within its classical 
(kinematic) firing envelope. Such a firing 
disrupts the original two-target game by 
starting an unexpected pursuit-evasion 
game between the Red missile and Blue air- 
craft. In order to survive, Blue must take 
evasive action. This action will lead to 
his successful escape from the missile, 
but it may prevent him at least tem- 
porarily from reaching an effective firing 
opportunity, i.e., the victory guaranteed 
by the two-target game solution. 
over, during this evasive maneuver R 
even be able to escape from the Blue 
winning zone. The insight gained by this 
interpretation illustrates the difficulty 
to model future air combat [ S I ,  within the 
frame of classical differential game 
theory - 
In the present paper a new approach is 
outlined for the analysis of a medium- 
range aggressive air-to-air engagement. It 
is based on combining Artificial Intelli- 
gence (AI) techniques with concepts of 
differential game theory. It turns out 
that these two seemingly different disci- 
plines can successfully complement each 
other in analyzing complex dynamic 
conflicts. such as an air combat game. 
This paper reports the design and the 
development of a Pilot Advisory System 
(PADS) prototype - mentioned first in a 
recently presented invited paper Clll - 
which implements the combination of the 
two disciplines for the analysis of an air 
combat duel with advanced medium-range 
missiles. PADS is designed to be the 
prototype of a real-time Expert System 
with a "knowledge base" composed of 
ial game concepts and solution 
In the next section the medium-range air 
combat duel with guided missiles is formu- 
plified modelling assumptions 
otype design are out1 
This section also states the require 
that PADS has to satisfy. It is 
by the outline of the imple 
concepts and the description of t 
structure. Finally an example with 
preliminary results is presented. 
bat duel of interest is 
two, supersonic fighters (Blue and Red) of 
E airborne radar 
rcraft are assu 
ilar performance and it is assu 
sile has two different 
ter being fired it uses 
guidance towards the 
of the target. For t 
issile and its tar 
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have to be kept in the infor 
the launching aircraft. At 
range the missile's active radar seeker is 
turned on, it searches and *'locks-on" the 
target. These missiles are fired beyond 
visual range and therefore the firing 
event is generally undetected by the 
target. Both aircraft may use radar and 
are also equipped with a passive warning 
system that detects missile "lock-on" ~ 
The entire duel can be considered as a 
sequence of missile firing exchanges 
posed of several phases: target detect 
pre-launch maneuver, missile deploy 
information to the mis ile until it locks- 
on), eventual disengagement (to avoid 
opponent missiles) and possible reengage- 
ment. The objective of each pilot (as 
stated in the Introduction) is to shoot 
down the opponent with certainty (P(K)=l) 
while guaranteeing own survival (P(S)=1). 
In most cases this ideal objective cannot 
be achieved because the engagement starts 
in the "draw" zone, where each player can 
guarantee his survival (P(S)=l). By using 
practical air combat terms one can say 
that unless a missile is fired inside its 
"no-escape" envelope it can be avoided if 
the target performs a proper disengagement 
aneuver. Generally, in order to reach a 
survival has to be put at risk. The need 
t-launch maneuver (a consequence 
properties) is an additional 
(launch), post-launch aneuver (to for 
"no-escape" firing opportunity, OWR 
constraint. 
For these reasons the practical objective 
of the air-to-air duel (in contrast with 
the ideal objective) has to be redefined 
by using a more flexible 
mulation, which can 
Blue aircraft) as: " ze PR(K) - the 
probability of shooting down the Red 
opponent - while guaranteeing that the 
probability of owg survival sati 
P (S)2PB(S), where PB(S)cl is prescri 
Note, that the value of OcFi(S)cl (i=B,R) 
can be used as a ea_sure of relative pre- 
ference ordering P.(S)=l indicates a 
1 
clear preference of "draw", while Pi (SI =O 
stands for preferring a " 
B 
- 
Such formulation defines a game which (in 
game theory terms) is always "strongly 
playable". This game may result, however, 
in a very low, even zero value of PR(K), 
because in the "draw" zone the survival of 
an optimally evading player is guaranteed. 
No player can expect an outcome other than 
the "guaranteed draw", unless his opponent 
behaves nonoptimally. Whenever this 
situation occurs there exists an appro- 
priate "reprisal" strategy C121, which 
allows to exploit such nonoptimality. The 
pilot can also prescribe the lowest 
acceptable value for the probability of 
opponent destruction $.(IC) (j*i, j=B,R). 
J 
One can thus s arize. that in reality 
both pilots ar illing to play "reprisal" 
games in the hope of identifying and 
taking advantage of the opponents errors. 
For a given nonopti a1 opponent strategy 
such a "reprisal" game is reduced to an 
optimal control proble evertheless, the 
ing aspect of the engage ent is pre- 
served, because a continuing and predict- 
a1 opponent behavior cannot 
be taken for granted. 
The most critical decision is the proper 
ing of missile firing. 
In future air c bat the above formulated 
complex differe ial game of imperfect in- 
ation has to be solved in real ti 
It is therefore required to design for the 
Blue aircrart a syste which can aid the 
pilot in selecting the controls at his 
disposal in order to achieve the 
possible outco 
In this paper, a prototype "Pilot Advisory 
roposed for performing 
task. For the sake of 
exploratory inves- 
system uses a set 
sequences, but d 
secondary effects 
dynamics. A recent s 
prototype design are: 
ent takes place in a 
horizontal plane of given altitude .(h) 
(see Fig. 1). 
adar look angle ( A x ) .  
aft are 
issiles c 
"lock-On" (ra) . 
issile scores a hit if it can reach 
the vicinity of its target satisfying a 
set of inequalities concerning the ti 
of flight, the final speed and the 
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6 .  The inherent uncertainties of the 
engagement are results of undetectable 
missile firings and unknown preference 
ordering of the opponent. 
7 .  The Red aircraft has a conventional 
firing control system which computes 
own missile envelopes, but does not 
have a system like PADS. Consequently, 
Red is assumed to decide on missile 
firing by using some heuristic doctrine 
and to start a disengagement maneuver 
if missile lock-on is detected. 
Remark, that based on assumptions 1 and 2 
the optimal post-launch and disengagement 
(missile avoidance) maneuvers can be 
uniquely determined. The post-launch 
maneuver is a turn away from the opponent 
but keeping it, as well as the recently 
fired missile, within the radar "look 
angle" limit. The optimal missile 
avoidance maneuver is a "hard" turn away 
from the missile line of sight towards a 
"tail-chase'' geometry. (See Fig. 2, where 
for sake of simplicity only the Blue 
maneuver sequence is depicted and Red 
continues on a straight line until Blue 
missile lock-on is detected). 
As a consequence of the last remark, the 
present section can be concluded by 
formally stating the requirements to be 
satisfied by the pilot advisory system 
(PADS) prototype designed for the above 
described simplified medium-range air 
combat duel scenario. The essential role 
of PADS is to establish a plan and propose 
to the Blue pilot an "optimal" (or at 
least satisfactory) missile firing 
sequence, which includes the following 
elements : 
a) the optimal pre-launch maneuver, 
b) the optimal timing for own missile 
c) the time to start disengagement to 
d) an eventual reengagement. 
This proposed plan is to be based on the 
last available information and- on some 
specific pilot inputs such as PB(S) and 
PR(K). PADS must display together with the 
"plan" the estimated outcome of the pro- 
posed firing sequence by PB(S) and PR(K). 
The pilot can either accept the proposed 
"plan" and carry it out as dictated by the 
flight and firing directives provided by 
PADS, or to change his inputs and request 
a modified "plan". 
launch, 
avoid the advisory missile, 
3. PADS - The Concept o f  Implementation 
3.1 General outline 
PADS is designed to be the prototype of a 
"real-time" Expert System with a very par- 
ticular structure, which integrates 
classical quantitative computation methods 
with rule based AI type techniques of 
qualitative reasoning. The "know ledge 
base" of this Expert System incorporates 
concepts of differential game solutions, 
as well as a special module for simulating 
the outcomes of eventual missile firings. 
The basic idea for implementing such a 
system is to decompose the complex 
original differential game of imperfect 
information into a set of solvable 
subgames. As a consequence of unknown 
"preference ordering" of the opponent, 
these sub-games are merely "reprisal" sub- 
games with some assumed opponent strategy. 
One can distinguish between "aggressive" 
and "defensive" subgames. The solution of 
an aggressive reprisal subgame is the 
earliest time for missile firing and the 
length of the respective post-launch 
maneuver for obtaining the destruction of 
an opponent which u s e s  a given assumed 
strategy. The solution of a defensive 
subgame is the latest time for starting an 
optimal missile avoidance maneuver in 
order to evade a missile launched by the 
opponent at a given assumed time. 
In fact, both types of reprisal subgames 
correspond to missile firing envelope com- 
putations, assuming a given target 
behavior. The firing envelope is the equi- 
valent of the "barrier" in a differential 
game of kind which separates the capture 
zone from other parts of the state space. 
In a dynamic environment the barrier of 
each reprisal subga e defines a critical 
point on the predicted trajectory. These 
points and the corresponding critical. 
timings can be obtained and verified by a 
set of appropriate simulations of the res- 
pective missile-aircraft engagements. The 
outcome of each simulation is the "miss 
distance" obtained when one of the pres- 
cribed stopping conditions is satisfied. 
The reprisal subgame solution, i.e. the 
critical point on the predicted trajectory 
is characterized by a miss distance which 
is equal to the lethal range of the 
missile. 
The design concept of PADS is implemented 
in two subsequent levels: 
a) In order to solve the.relevant reprisal 
subgames PADS has to manipulate the 
respective set of simulations. 
b) At a higher level, the subgame results 
have to be evaluated by a rule based 
automated reasoning process. 
3.2 "Reprisal" subgames 
Each reprisal subgame, being essentially a 
firing envelope computation o f  a guided 
missile against a target of an assumed 
strategy, can be defined in the context of 
an air combat duel by the following 
elements : 
a) the aircraft .which fires (launches) the 
b) the post-launch behavior of the firing 
missile at t=t (Blue or Red), L 
aircraft , 
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c) the post-launch behavior of the target 
aircraft . 
It is assumed that the post-launch trajec- 
tory of each aircraft is composed of three 
segments : 
a) straight flight for a period of 
(At)l, Itl=t L +(At),], 
b) a turn (either to the right or to the 
left) until the "look-angle limit" is 
reached, continued by a segment 
satisfying this constraint, 
c) an optimal missile avoidance maneuver 
starting at the time te. 
As a consequence of this assumption the 
post-launch behavior of each aircraft is 
characterized bY the triplet 
[(At),,(dir),t 1 where (dir) is a binary 
variable having the values "right" and 
"left" . The selection of this binary 
variable can be based either on geo- 
metrical conditions or can be a random 
process. 
In general, the value of (At), for the 
firing aircraft is zero, since after 
firing its own missile the pilot wishes to 
minimize the closing speed with any even- 
tually fired missile of the opponent. A 
post-launch turning maneuver, however, can 
be easily detected by the adversary air- 
craft and thus providing a strong "hint" 
OR the event of missile firing. In order 
to deny the adversary such information the 
pilot can consider selecting (AtIl>O. For 
the firing aircraft the value of te is 
associated generally with the event of own 
missile "lock-on" the target and becoming 
"active" (te=ta). Another reasonable 
strategy calls to start evasion when the 
"warning" on the opponent missile lock-on 
is received (te=tw). In such a case with 
tw'ta the probability of own missile lock- 
on has to be considered. 
The post-launch behavior of the target 
aircraft depends on two elements, namely 
the decision of its pilot on an eventual 
firing (aggressive target) as well as his 
"preference ordering". 
In the next subsection some reprisal sub- 
game examples are given. 
3.3 Subgame examples 
In typical defensive reprisal subgames, 
introduced in 3.1, the time of missile 
firing t is assumed to be given while the 
strategy of the launching aircraft is 
characterized by Atl=O and te=ta. The 
target aircraft trajectory is assumed to 
be prescribed and the solution required to 
find the critical value of "t "e for a 
marginal escape. 
In most aggressive reprisal subgames the 
e 
L 
strategy of the launching aircraft remains 
the same (Atl=O, t =t ) -  These subgames 
can thus be characterized by target 
behavior. The first distinction is be- 
tween non-aggressive and aggressive target 
behavior, the former implying that no 
counter-fire is considered and conse- 
quently the "look-angle limit" segment is 
absent. The most important examples of 
such a subgame are: 
e a  
The target (probably unaware of the 
missile) continues to fly in a straight 
line until the end of the simulation 
(tl=tf). This subgame is called the 
subgame, because the resulting Rmax 
firing range is maximal. 
The target starts the missile avoidance 
maneuver at missile launch (te=t =t 1 .  
This subgame, the worst case from the 
firing aircraft point of view, 
determines the "no-escape'' range of the 
missile and thus called the NE subgame. 
The target continues to fly in a 
straight line until missile lock-on 
warning is received (t =t =t ) .  The 
result of this subgame, called the LNE 
subgame, is between the results of the 
two extremes stated in (a) and (b). 
1 L  
e l w  
Aggressive reprisal subgames against 
aggressively behaving targets have a very 
large variety. Interesting examples are 
those where both aircraft fire simul- 
taneously and both start the post-launch 
turn with Atl=O. 
In PADS two examples of such subgames are 
used frequently. The first is called the 
SNE (shoot/no-escape) subgame and the 
other is called the NES (no-escape/shoot) 
subgame. In both subga es the firing air- 
craft continues the ost-launch "look- 
angle limit" constrained trajectory until 
its missile becomes active (te=ta). The 
difference between these subgames lies in 
the target behavior. In the SNE subgame 
the target aircraft prefers a mutual sur- 
vival (i.e. "draw") on a "mutual kill" and 
therefore starts the evasion when the 
warning of opponent missile lock-on is 
detected (te=tw), while in the NES subgame 
its behavior is si ilar to the firing air- 
craft (te=ta). 
3.4 Opponent behavior model 
As mentioned earlier the original complex 
differential game is decomposed into a set 
of "reprisal" subgames. In each such sub- 
game a different opponent strategy 
(behavior) is assumed, as has been already 
illustrated by the examples given in the 
previous subsection. In order to evaluate 
the different subgame solutions in the 
planning process carried out by PADS it is 
necessary to have some behavior model of 
the opponent (the pilot of the Red 
aircraft). 
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The first element in such a behavior model 
relates to the motivation of the opponent, 
reflecting either an aggressive or defen- 
sive nature. As was already pointed out, 
if the Red pilot wishes to behave 
defensively and follows the corresponding 
optimal evasion strategy it might be 
impossible to shoot him down, unless the 
initial conditions of the engagement are 
very unfavorable to him. In the sequel it 
is assumed that the basic motivation of 
the opponent is aggressive, namely he 
wishes to launch a missile against the 
Blue aircraft. Such aggressive attention 
is directly verified by PADS by observing 
the positive closing speed component of 
the Red aircraft. 
The strategy of an aggressive opponent can 
be characterized by his "firing doctrine", 
i.e. the conditions (the range) when 
missile launch is planned to take place, 
and his post-launch behavior. In the pre- 
sent prototype version of PADS the "firing 
doctrine" of the opponent is described by 
a probabilistic model, expressed by the 
accumulated a priori probability of 
missile launch at any given range. In 
generating this model it is assumed that 
the Red aircraft is equipped with a con- 
ventional firing control system, which can 
compute the firing envelopes associated 
with Rmax, NE and LNE subgames. An 
example of such accumulated launch proba- 
bility model is presented in Fig. 3 .  In 
this example no missile launch takes place 
before Rmax is reached, as well as after 
the so-called "no-escape'' range. Under 
these assumptions the model is determined 
by two parameters. The percentage of the 
missiles launched between Rmax and the LNE 
firing envelope and the probability 
density (the slope of the accumulated pro- 
bability) at that range. 
The post-launch behavior of the opponent 
is defined by the elements in subsection 
3.2. It is assumed that the Red aircraft 
starts the post-launch turn with (At)l=O. 
The direction of this turn can be either 
to the left or to the right with equal 
probability, unless the interception geo- 
metry provides a definite advantage for 
one of the alternatives. 
The next element of the opponent behavior 
ode1 is "t," the start of the missile 
avoidance maneuver. This is probably the 
most critical element of the Red strategy 
reflecting clearly his "preference 
ordering" and the level of his 
aggressiveness. In the presently used 
model 4 different Red strategy 
alternatives are considered: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
"cautious defensive" determined by 
t =minCt 
"nominal defensive", determined by 
t =t 
"nominal aggressive", determined by 
aYtw' e 
e w  
t =t e a  
e 
d - "strongly aggressive" determined by 
altw' t =max[t 
In the opponent behavior model of PADS 
each alternative is associated with a pro- 
bability such that P(a)+P(b)+P(c)+P(d)=l. 
As can be seen, even in the present proto- 
type there is a great variety of possible 
opponent models, from which one has to be 
selected. Such a selection has to be 
based on previous knowledge (intelligence) 
of the opponent as well as on the 
intuition of the Blue pilot operating with 
PADS. Some of the information is deter- 
ministic, but some element has to be 
"guessed" by the Blue pilot. These 
guesses can be verified in some degree by 
observing the Red aircraft trajectory and 
comparing it to an expected one. Real- 
time intelligence from the ground can also 
be incorporated in the Red behavior model 
and PADS is designed to perform such model 
updating. 
3.5 Planninz strategy 
The key function of PADS is the planning 
of a firing sequence to be proposed to the 
Blue pilot. The elements of such a plan 
are outlined in the last part of Section 
2. For this purpose PADS has to define a 
set of relevant reprisal subgames. It has 
to manipulate the respective simulation 
models for obtaining the required subgame 
solutions. Finally it has to evaluate 
these results, by using a rule based auto- 
mated reasoning process, for completing a 
satisfactory firing sequence plan. If the 
pilot inpuss, determiling the acceptable 
values of PB(S) and PR(K) and real-time 
state measurements do not lead to such a 
plan, the pilot has to be warned and 
alternative action has to be proposed. 
The functional block diagram of PADS is 
given in Fig. 4. 
The first phase of the planning is to 
assess the possibility of a "safe 
winning", the best outcome for the Blue 
aircraft, defined by PB(S)=PK(R)=l. The 
test for the feasibility of a 
able outcome involves finding a firing 
sequence (tL, tl, tal for which taAtg, 
where tg is the lowest value obtained from 
the set of envisaged defensive subgame 
solutions. If this test provides an 
affirmative answer the Blue pilot is 
guided to carry it out. 
In many (probably in most) cases the "safe 
winning" test will yield a negative 
answer. Therefore, the most important 
task of an efficient advisory system, such 
as PADS, is to plan and propose other 
acceptable alternative options. In the 
present prototype design the following 
options are considered: 
a. disengagement as soon as possible in 
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b. 
C. 
d. 
order to avoid any risk, 
not to launch own missile but delay 
disengagement as long as safe escape 
(solution of the defensive subgames) is 
possible , 
an **early" but "safe" launch charac- 
terized by taLt;, knowing that own 
missile can be avoided by the opponent 
CPR(K) can be zero], 
a "late", but probably "effective" 
firing, the success of which depends on 
the level of risk Laken by the Blue 
pilot expressed by P ( S ) .  B 
The Blue pilot can make his decision 
either before the Red aircraft is iden- 
tified as an aggressive opponent or after 
the "safe winning" test is completed. If 
option (a), is selected the task of PADS 
the Blue pilot selects option (b), he gen- 
erally has the intention to wait for an 
eventual mistake to be made by the oppo- 
nent, which may improve the situation and 
lead to a "safe winning". In this case 
PADS continues to repeat the "safe 
winning" test as long as the time for safe 
disengagement arrives. 
Selection of options (c), or (d) by the 
Blue pilot requires PADS to carry out a 
search, guided by an appropriate automated 
reasoning process, for a satisfactory 
firing sequence. In these cases the out- 
come is evaluated, by using the opponent 
behavior model described in 3.3 ,  and com- 
pared to the pilot's requirements. 
The "early" firing of option (c), 
generally implies P (S)=l and may be 
intended to prevent the opponent from 
plishing his aggressive task at the 
cost of a noneffective own missile firing. 
The planning for option d. is a search for 
a compromise solution (if it exists) or to 
determine the highest value of PR(K) for 
the given PB(S). If such a search fails 
Ci.e. Pi(K)tPR(R)I then the Blue pilot is 
asked either to select another option or 
50 change at least one of the input values 
PB(S), PR(K). 
Once a plan is accepted by the Blue pilot 
tinues to test its validity and at 
time provides flight and firing 
es to the pilot. Accepting a plan 
based on option (d), involves a delayed 
decision of the pilot, as is explained in 
the sequel. 
As long as actual missile launch has not 
taken place the Blue pilot can change his 
mind and the selected option. After 
missile launch PADS function is concen- 
puting the predicted time for 
ock on (tal and the time for 
is terminated after the first phase. If 
B 
the last "safe" disengagement tx If e 
t ctx the actual firing sequence can be 
eted without any risk. If, however, 
ta'tg - a case likely to happen if option 
(d), is selected - a decision has to be 
made by the pilot whether to follow the 
previously selected plan or act either 
defensively (teLt;) or aggressively 
(t,=t ) .  Of course interim decisions can 
also be taken. Detection of an actual 
missile warning may be used for verifying 
assumed opponent missile firing. 
4. On PADS'S Structure 
a 
The schematic structure of PADS is pre- 
sented in Fig. 5 .  PADS'S functions, as 
described in the previous section, involve 
interface with the pilot. At pre-flight 
the pilot has to transfer, with the help 
of the knowledge engineer, his subjective 
knowledge (experience, preference ordering 
etc. ) for solving the "subjective optimal" 
game to be played. oreover, updated 
intelligence data on the potential oppo- 
nents have to be verified and stored. 
General knowledge concerning fighting 
doctrine, own aerodynamic and missile 
data, as well as inference rules used in 
the automated reasoning process can be 
equally updated at the same time. 
During flight, PADS must display its 
advice, answer any questions and explain 
how different conclusions are derived. For 
acting properly in flight, PADS 
receive sensor-data and to co 
with the differential "reprisal" 
debriefing may take place. 
ulation module. After the flight a 
The tasks of PADS can be qualitatively 
performed using an Expert System 
structure. An Expert System is a rule 
based AI application program for per- 
forming a task which requires expertise. 
It generally consists of the following 
elements: user interface, data base, know- 
ledge base and inference engine. The user 
interface allows interaction with the user 
such as asking questions and getting 
answers about the knowledge base, 
including the process of deduction. The 
knowledge base includes the definition of 
differential game concepts as well as a 
simulation module for "reprisal" subgame 
solution - The inference engine mani- 
pulates the subga e simulations and drives 
the automated rule based reasoning 
process. In our prototype design only a 
small set of such rules was implemented. 
Nevertheless, we laid the ground and pre- 
pared the tools and mechanism for a 
larger, more complex system that will be 
required both for a more realistic duel 
and for a multi-aircraft scenario, where 
the number of rules and the complexity of 
rule interaction may increase by orders of 
magnitude. 
The rules and data in PADS are organized 
in a so called "frame based system'' C141 
as shown in Fig. 6 showing the upper level 
knowledge base corresponding to aircraft 
Blue. A "frame" is a data structure that 
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contains pointers to all information items 
relevant to the concept that i s  
represented by the frame. For example, the 
Blue aircraft is such a concept. An air- 
craft in general is another. Relevant 
informatien can be the aircraft's maximal 
velocity, its weapon arsenal, its pilot's 
identity, etc. The frame bears the name of 
its concept, and the pointers inhabit 
"slots" of different types (called 
"facets") in the frame as can be seen in 
Fig. 7. Frames are arranged in a hierarchy 
of class inclusions, linked by so called 
"IS-A" pointers. This hierarchy enables, 
for example, the Red aircraft to "inherit" 
the fact that it has wings from the data 
associated with the general aircraft 
frame, and thus reduces duplication of 
data. 
As mentioned earlier an important part of 
the knowledge is generated on-line by 
manipulating differential subgame simu- 
lations. This manipulation is based on 
measured data, pilot input and target 
information as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
5. Numerical Results 
A typical operation of PADS is an example 
of equal speed aircraft (V =V =350 m/sec) 
was illustrated in a previous paper [ll]. 
In that example a "safe winning" 
CPR(K)=PB(S)=lJ was not possible because 
the first time for an "effective firing 
opportunity" (34.5 sec) was later than the 
last time for a "safe and completed firing 
sequence" (32.3 sec). Thus, PADS had to 
plan and evaluate compromise solutions 
leading PADS to propose to the Blue pilot 
a firing sequence starting at 
3 2 . 3 ~ t ~ ~ ~ 3 4 . 5 .  In the same example it was 
also shown, that by continuously updating 
the planning process PADS can take 
advantage of any nonoptimal action of the 
opponent by proposing to the Blue pilot a 
firing sequence of an improved outcome. 
In the present section some numerical 
results, indicating the effect of speed 
differences (VB*VR), are presented. In 
all examples the air combat duel takes 
place at the altitude of 8 km and the 
turning rate of both aircraft is limited 
by a load factor of nmax=9. 
B R  
First the example of VB=380 m/sec and 
V =350 m/sec is considered, followed by 
the case of V =350 m/sec but VR=380 m/sec. 
In each case PADS starts the planning 
phase by computing three critical times 
for the Blue aircraft: 
R 
B 
(i) The last time for "safe 
disengagement" from all possible missiles, 
assuming straight flying trajectories of 
both aircraft. This "last escape" time 
serves merely as a reference value for the 
cases where the pilot decides not to 
deploy his weapon. For the first example 
(VB>VR) tgB=42.6 sec, the most threatening 
missile being launched at tLR=35.5 sec at 
a range of 24.1 km. For the second example 
(VB<VR) teB- 40.4 sec and the most 
threatening missile corresponds to 
tLR=40.0 sec at a range of 20.8 km, very 
near to the "no-escape'' range ~ 
(ii) The first "effective firing 
opportunity" is computed by the SNE 
subgame. For the first example (VB>VR) it 
starts at tLB=34.5 sec (r=24.9 km) and 
missile lock-on is achieved at taB=48.8 
sec. For the second example (VB<VR) 
tLB=37.8 sec (r=22.4 km) and taB=50.1 sec. 
If the Red aircraft launches after tLB and 
starts missile avoidance only when warning 
is received it will be hit by every Blue 
missile fired after the above computed 
time (if it can lock-on the target). 
(iii) The last time for a "safe and 
completed firing sequence" against an 
aggressively acting intelligent opponent 
taking into account the most threatening 
missile. This firing sequence starts for 
ple (VB>VR) at tLB=35.0 sec 
(r=24.5 km) and allows missile updating 
until taB=48.4 sec on a post-launch 
trajectory. F o r  the second exa 
tLB=31.6 sec (r=26-9 k ) and taB=47.1 sec. 
These results clearly indicate how speed 
advantage is directly translated to 
tactical advantage in an air combat duel. 
The first indicator is the 2.2 sec 
difference in the last time for "safe 
disengagement", allowing longer time for 
deciding on a final action. The main 
difference is exhibited by the fact that 
in the first example (VB>VR) a "safe 
winning" is possible while in the other 
case (VR<VB) the situation is seriously 
degraded in comparison to the equal speed 
case - 
In the first example (VB>VR) PADS will 
propose to the Blue pilot to start a 
firing sequence 34.5 sec tLB i 35.0 sec 
guaranteeing him a "safe winning". In the 
second example (VB<VR) the situation is 
more complex. Depending on the pilot's 
preference ordering an acceptable firing 
sequence may arise. Moreover, any non- 
optimal action of the opponent can be 
exploited by PADS to improve the 
situation. In any case PADS provides the 
Blue pilot with a "safe disengagement" 
option, which may be used particularly in 
an initially disadvantageous tactical 
situation. 
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6. Conclusions 
In the present paper a prototype design of 
a pilot advisory system {PADS) for a 
medium-range air combat duel with advanced 
air--to-air missiles is described. The 
design is based on a new approach of pro- 
posing to combine differential game con- 
cepts and Artificial Intelligence tech- 
niques, in order to benefit the comple- 
menting features of both disciplines. Such 
synergisms shouldn't be a surprise, if one 
recalls that any game can be presented in 
extensive form by a decision tree. Since 
the problem of interest is too complex to 
fit in the frame of classical differential 
game theory, it is decoupled into a set of 
"reprisal" subgames ~ Each subgame is 
characterized by a different assumed 
opponent behavior and it represents a 
branch of the decision tree. 
PADS is designed to operate as a real-time 
Expert System with a "knowledge-base", 
which incorporates concepts of air-to-air 
combat and differential game theory. Its 
inference engine manipulates "reprisal" 
subgame simulations and evaluates their 
outcome. The results of this automated 
reasoning process serve as the basis for 
planning the optimal multiphase missile 
firing sequence and determining the 
optimal timing of missile deployment and 
disengagement maneuver. The planning is 
continuously updated taking into account 
the actual events of the engagement. 
PADS provides a meaningful solution for 
one of the basic and probably the most 
challenging tasks of a future Pilot 
Associate System. It is designed to pre- 
sent to the pilot vital information which 
can be used either to guarantee survival, 
or to maximize the probability of winning 
with an accepted level of risk. Moreover, 
the system allows to take advantage of any 
nonoptimal action of the opponent. 
In the presently used PADS prototype, 
designed for an air-to-air duel of a 
simplified dynamic model, the genuine AI 
elements form only a smaller part of the 
active software. But, since the investi- 
gation is planned to be extended for 
three-dimensional multiple aircraft 
scenarios with realistic variable speed 
aircraft models, this proportion will 
dramatically change in the future. The 
prototype design laid the ground and pre- 
pared the tools for such an extension. 
The results presented in the paper are 
part of an ongoing investigation, and due 
to the simplified dynamic model are 
of an exploratory nature. They are, how- 
ever, very encouraging. They demonstrate 
that the new approach, based on judicious 
combination of AI techniques and concepts 
of differential game theory, can be 
successfully implemented and applied in 
solving a complex dynamic conflict, such 
as an air-to-air combat duel. The results 
a l so  indicate some of the great tactical 
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